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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION:
CAN THE STATE PRESERVE DIRECT DEMOCRACY FOR THE
CITIZEN, OR WILL IT BE CONSUMED BY THE SPECIAL
INTEREST GROUP?

I.

INTRODUCTION

The ability of the citizen to directly initiate law within his or her own state
is a right that has been fought for and achieved by the people. Direct
democracy places the power to initiate law into the hands of the citizen through
the ballot box. In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation
[ACLF],1 the United States Supreme Court invalidated Colorado’s attempt to
place controls, designed to prevent fraud and ensure efficiency on the state’s
direct democracy system, because the controls directly hindered the freedom of
political speech. The challenged regulations were found to unconstitutionally
burden core political speech, without narrowly promoting a compelling state
interest. The Court’s opinion, emphasizing freedom of political speech over
the state’s legitimate interest of protection, however, could serve to undercut
the objective of direct democracy: to provide the citizen with greater control in
the political system. The Court has furthered the ability of special interest
groups to consume the process by using their large pocketbooks to promote
legislation advantageous to their private concerns, effectively shutting out
smaller grassroots concerns. Seeking to prevent fraud and corruption by bigmoney out-of-state special interest groups, Colorado failed in its attempt to
restrict the process to allow better information to be provided to voters when
such groups are sponsoring referendums.
This paper will examine the policy behind direct democracy, its influence
in state government, and how the decision in Buckley v. ACLF has affected the
ability of states to place controls on the process. The author’s view is that
although the exact level of scrutiny to apply after the Court’s decision is
uncertain, it can provide a state some guidance to regulate the initiative
process. To prevent special interest groups from overwhelming the direct
democracy system, states have found it necessary to place controls to keep the
system open for the grass roots initiatives for which the system was originally
envisioned. The states, however, may not impede political speech in
attempting to preserve the grass roots objectives of direct democracy. Section

1. 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999).
177
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II provides a background to the theories underlying direct democracy, how it
has developed through our nation’s history, and the response by state
legislatures. Section III contains the procedural posture for Buckley v. ACLF.
In this section, the author will examine through the arguments of the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions the three Colorado provisions struck down
by the Court, namely the registered voter restriction, the identification badge
restriction, and the financial disclosure provisions. Section IV contains the
author’s analysis of the Court’s varying opinions on the proper level of
scrutiny to the registered voter and financial disclosure requirements. Since
the identification badge requirement was unanimously found by the Court to be
unconstitutional,2 it will be discussed briefly. This section also analyzes the
balance between the state’s ability to safeguard the direct democracy process,
without interfering with the freedom of political speech, as well as the possible
implications that this ruling may have on the state and the citizen. Section V
will conclude the author’s view. The constitutionality of certain propositions
sought through direct democracy means will not be discussed in this paper.
Many questions arise toward the variety of discriminatory laws that find their
way to implementation through the ballot box,3 however that issue is beyond
the scope of analyzing the direct democracy process itself. Nor will this paper
discuss the corrupt use of campaign contributions and lobbying by special
interest groups within the legislature to promote beneficial legislation,4 other
than how it has contributed to the necessity of alternative methods
In order to ensure a reliable and efficient system, states have found it
necessary to place controls on the process. Restrictions on direct democracy
are a necessary protection to ensure voters are well informed of not only the
issue in the initiative, but the sources behind it. Core political speech is a
fundamental right protected by the First Amendment, however it is not
absolute. If the objectives of direct democracy are to be obtained, the process
itself must be safeguarded to ensure the citizen, and not just the group with the
largest pocketbook, has the power to initiate law. Although the Court in
Buckley v. ACLF struck down the state imposed restrictions, it serves as a
2. See id. at 646, 651 (Thomas, J., concurring), 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part), 662 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
3. One problem that has arisen with initiatives is the occasional use of the system to
“restrict the services provided or rights accorded to a relatively unpopular group.” CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 229 (Shaun Bowler, et. al., eds.,
1998). For instance, the State of Nebraska voted by an overwhelming majority of 70% in support
of initiative 416, recognizing marriage as only between a man and a woman. Stephen Buttry &
Leslei Reed, Same Sex Marriage Ban Passes Overwhelmingly, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Nov. 8,
2000, at A1.
4. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, How the Little Guy Gets Crunched, TIME, Feb.
7, 2000, at 38 (discussing how powerful interests pour in millions of dollars in campaign
contributions to get laws passed advantageous to them and hurtful for those who are not able to
contribute similar amounts of money).
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guide to allow the state the ability to safeguard the direct democracy process,
while ensuring its citizens the freedom to political speech.
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Direct democracy provides the “opportunity for groups and individuals to
draft legislation directly, to overturn laws adopted by legislatures, and to recall
defective representatives.”5 It allows for citizens who are not part of the
legislative process to draft their own laws through grassroots efforts.6
However, changes in the contemporary era might have removed the “citizen”
from the grassroots.7 Throughout the development of democratic forms of
government, direct democracy have existed to allow the people to have a
direct, although minimal, voice in the government.8 Even prior to democratic
rule, many ancient societies recognized the right of ordinary citizens to petition
the government, including the right to suggest specific changes in legislation.9
The early uses of direct democracy, however, differ from today.10 Modern
forms of direct democracy available in the United States include the initiative,
referendum, and the recall.11 The initiative provides the people the right to
introduce legislation through popular vote by allowing the citizens, through the
collection of voter signatures, to propose legislation and make it law through a
vote of the electorate.12 The initiative is found in two forms throughout the
United States. A direct initiative can be either a constitutional amendment or a
statute that is proposed through a petition and then submitted directly to the
voters for approval or rejection, without any action by the legislature.13 Once
the initiative has been voted and approved by the electorate, the initiative has
the force and effect of a constitutional amendment or statute. In comparison,
the indirect initiative allows statutes to be proposed by a petition that is first
submitted to the state legislature who then debates and votes on the petition in

5. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 19.
8. “Ancient Athens, Saxon tribes, Thirteenth Century Swiss cantons, and numerous other
peoples from earlier times all regularly made governmental decisions through some form of faceto-face meeting.” DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 31-33 (1984).
9. PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVES: ISSUES, OPTIONS,
AND COMPARISONS 7 (1998).
10. Id.
11. The referendum is a procedure allowing citizens to force a public vote on statues adopted
by the legislature, while the recall allows citizens to force a vote, through the collection of
signatures, as to whether a particular, named elected official shall continue in office. DUBOIS &
FEENEY, supra note 9, at 7-8.
12. Id.
13. MAGLEBY, supra note 8, at 35.
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a regular session.14 However, if the statute has not been approved by the
legislature after a specified time, or if the legislature has amended the original
initiative in a way unacceptable to the original proponents, the proponents may
then gather the remaining required signatures and submit the original initiative
to the voters as a direct initiative.15 Some states provide that if the legislature
does not approve the indirectly initiated proposal, it may offer a substitute
proposal on the same subject to accompany the original one on the next general
election ballot.
The use of direct democracy in the United States has been a subject of
debate since the establishment of the representative form of government.16
Numerous arguments against giving direct power to the population have been
made since the founding of this country.17 The authors of the Constitution
preferred a system of representative government, rather than leaving control of
the country in the hands of the population.18 They believed the most important
political questions were too complicated to be decided by popular vote.19 The
system was designed to allow elected representatives, who would have time to
study and understand the laws, to debate the merits of the legislation.20 James
Madison feared that “factions” would be controlled by “popular passions” and
would force their majority beliefs and ideas over the minority.21 A continuing
concern that has accompanied the use of direct democracy is the fear that
“direct democracy would produce policies hostile to the interests of unpopular

14. Id. at 35-6.
15. Id.
16. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 1.
17. Professor Magleby has provided a list of the arguments against direct legislation,
including: the true beneficiaries of direct legislation will not be the people but the special
interests; direct legislation will result in an unreasonably complex ballot and “frivolous”
legislation; voters are ill-equipped to understand complicated proposals and unprepared to grapple
with the confusing campaigns and appeals that are a part of the initiative process; the legislative
process is a much better way to make public policy; direct legislation will not educate the voters,
nor will it increase interest in government; direct legislation will endanger democracy and
undermine representative government. MAGLEBY, supra note 8, at 29-30.
18. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 2.
19. Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct
Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 424
(1998).
20. Id.
21. Id. According to James Madison, a “faction” consists of “a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and activated by some common
impulse of passion, or of intent adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.” Id. at 424 (citing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10, at 78
(James Madison) (Clinton Rosier ed., 1961), available at http://www.mcs.net/~knautzr/
fed/fed10.htm).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION

181

minorities.”22 Madison also believed the control of such a large country could
not be left to the population as a whole, but rather decisions should be made by
a “relatively small number of people representing the larger population.”23
Madison wrote that representative government “refine[s] and enlarge[s] public
views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of our country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations.”24 The founding fathers believed that societal problems
were too complicated to be resolved by the public through the use of the
initiative, and were better left to the legislature to be developed in a wellreasoned analysis.25 Those who opposed the use of direct democracy in the
United States successfully prevented its use for the first one hundred years of
this nation.
Starting in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a movement
arose to give greater control to the people. The Populists26 and later the
Progressives27 fashioned and promoted the initiative, referendum, and the
recall.28 They believed that legislatures and political party machines in the
period of economic prosperity had become too dependent on special interests
to allow the true needs of the country to be promoted.29 Their objective was
not to abolish the representative form of government, but to advance a greater
popular participation to bring an end to the corruption.30 Early twentieth
century reformers hoped that by gaining more direct access to the legislative
process, citizens would be able to control public affairs and thereby “insure
responsive as well as responsible government.”31 The Progressive movement
22. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 11. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
23. Frickey, supra note 19, at 424 (citing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10, supra note 21,
at 83).
24. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10, supra note 21, at 82.
25. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 16.
26. The Populists consisted of midwestern farmers and were most aggressive in the late
Nineteenth Century. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS, THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
REVOLUTION 7 (1989).
27. The Progressives were pro-labor Democrats that adopted most of the Populists’ reform
agenda including home rule, nonpartisan elections, the commission plan for local government,
merit systems, direct election of United States senators, women’s suffrage, and independent
regulatory commissions as well as the forms of direct democracy, as their own, drawing their
strength and leadership from young, prosperous members of the urban middle class who saw the
corruption of the cities and wanted to expose the social problems and government and corporate
wrongdoing. Id. at 9 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131, 167 (1956)).
28. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 7-8 and accompanying text.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id.
31. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 1 (citing FREDERIC C. HOWE, THE CITY:
THE HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY (1967)).
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advanced the ballot initiative as a means of limiting the control of wealthy
special interests and restoring electoral power to the voters.32 Direct
democracy benefits society by including opportunities for citizens to
participate directly in making laws under which they live, creating a wellfunctioning democracy, increasing the interest and participation in
government, reducing citizen alienation, and serving as an antidote for
declining voter turnout in elections.33
Throughout the twentieth century, many of the states implemented a direct
democracy process.34 It has been used for a variety of issues of which the
citizens believed the legislatures were either unresponsive or unwilling to
initiate. For instance, “in 1992 citizens from twelve states adopted term limits
for their state legislatures through the initiative process and voted on such
matters as health care, the right to die, welfare reform, tax reduction, and
government structure.”35 It is recognized that direct democracy basically
serves one purpose: “to provide another lawmaking outlet for organized
interests that fail to get what they want from the legislature.”36 The explosion
in the use of direct democracy by special interest groups over the past two
decades has transformed the process into a big-dollar industry.37 In 1990, the
average total expenditure for each ballot measure in Oregon climbed to more
than $900,000.38 In recent years, the initiative and referendum process has
come to be more and more influenced by out-of-state interests, which employ
professional nationwide firms whom have transformed the grassroots initiative
into a big money industry.39 Professor David Magleby has closely examined
32. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. 636, 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also H. CROLY,
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 236-37, 248-49, 254-55 (Transaction ed., 1998); H. STEELE
COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 338 (1950); Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of
Direct Democracy, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 23 (1997).
33. MAGLEBEY, supra note 8, at 45-51.
34. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 28 tbl.1. Today, 24 states and the District of
Colombia have adopted some form of direct democracy. Id. States that have enacted the direct
initiative are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota.
States that have enacted the indirect initiative include: Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, and Wyoming. Both Utah and Washington allow for both direct and indirect
initiatives. Id.
35. Id. at 1.
36. Frickey, supra note 19, at 432.
37. Id. (citing Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 381,
385 n.15 (1984)).
38. See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN OREGON 13
(1996) (providing the number of initiatives in 1994); Nena Baker, Need a Hand with Your
Ballot?, THE OREGONIAN (Portland, OR), Oct. 27, 1996, at A1 (providing the number of
initiatives for 1996).
39. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (1999); See, e.g.,
Lowenstein & Stern, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators, 17 HASTINGS
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and provided explicit data on the use of direct democracy by different groups
today.40 He notes that direct democracy has valued public “participation, open
access, and political equality,” however, competition between the professional
firms to expand the base of their participants have prevented compromise and
continuity.41 Initiative agendas are generally set by the “capacity to hire
professional signature-gathering firms or by the dedication of issue activists or
single-issue groups” rather than by “issues of prominent concern to the general
population.”42 Unfortunately, the objectives of increased voter turnout and
reduction of alienation of the people have not occurred.43 It has been
recognized that overall, “direct legislation is prone to serious biases insofar as
participation and representation are concerned.”44 Serious concerns continue
to exist as to whether the objectives of direct democracy have been met in view
of the role special interest groups have played.45
State reactions to the use of the initiative process by special-interest groups
have been to impose restrictions to prevent abuse. When states regulate the
ballot process, questions arise in balancing the heightened protection for
political speech under the First Amendment against state interests of ensuring a
fair and orderly democratic process. The Supreme Court generally applies a
strict scrutiny standard when a fundamental right is involved under the First
Amendment,46 applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.47
The proper level of scrutiny will be examined in the next section. States have
considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the ballot
initiative process similar to the general election process.48 The First
Amendment requires the courts to be vigilant in guarding against undue
hindrances to political conservation and the exchange of ideas.49 Unless the

CONST. L.Q. 175, 176 (1989); Broader, Ballot Battle, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1998, at A1, A6;
Slind-Flor, Election Result: Litigation over Propositions, NATIONAL L. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A1,
A8.
40. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 18. See MAGLEBY, supra note 8, at 181.
41. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 18.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
47. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring). The First Amendment
protections of speech, press, and religion have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 n.5 (1968) (citing Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
48. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 637.
49. Id. See also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988).
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state can justify regulations that limit free speech by demonstrating a
compelling state interest, the court will strike the regulation down.
III. BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION
The Supreme Court found that Colorado, in its attempt to place controls on
the abuse of the direct democracy system by large special interest groups, had
violated First Amendment protections of political speech. The Court’s multiopinioned decision demonstrates the difficulty in creating regulations on the
initiative process without imposing undue burdens on the fundamental right to
political speech. The four opinions apply a flexible standard of review,
however, the standard differs in each analysis. As a result, the opinions
disagree as to the constitutionality of the registered voter requirement and the
financial disclosure provision. The identification badge requirement was
unanimously found to be an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner’s right to
anonymity by requiring petitioners to wear a badge identifying their name and
if they were paid or a volunteer.
A.

Direct Democracy in Colorado

Colorado is one of several states to allow its citizens to make law directly
through initiatives placed on election ballots through the direct initiative.50
The process is designed to give citizens more control over the initiation of laws
that they believe the State Legislature has failed to enact. However, the direct
approach, as opposed to the indirect, does not allow for the legislature to
examine the proposition. Contrary to the grass-roots purpose of direct
democracy, it has been used as a tool by special interest groups to enact
legislation and bypass the state legislature altogether. In an attempt to curtail
this use by special interest groups, the state of Colorado had attempted to
restrict direct democracy prior to Buckley v. ACFL to allow voters the
opportunity to be fully informed of their decisions. In its 1988 decision of
Meyer v. Grant, the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado law that prohibited
payment to circulators of ballot-initiative petitions.51 The Court held petition
circulation to be “core political speech,” which is protected by the First
Amendment because it involves “interactive communication concerning
50. See COLO. CONST. art. V, §§1(1), (2); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 – 133 (1998). The
initiative has become an important feature of Colorado government since it was adopted by the
state in 1910. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 28 tbl. 1. From its adoption until 1996,
Colorado voters have had 153 initiatives on the ballot. Id. at 32 tbl. 5. Colorado has the fourth
greatest use of the ballot initiative, and has a 39% adoption rate. Id. As of 1996, the top three
states with the greatest number of initiatives placed on the ballot are Oregon with 292 and a 34%
rate, California with 257 and a 33% rate, and North Dakota with 170 and a 45% rate. Id. The
initiative process in Colorado has been used forty-four times for statutes and 109 times to amend
the constitution from its adoption through 1996. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 30 tbl. 3.
51. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
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political change.”52 However, the Court also recognized that “there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”53 In
recognizing the need for state regulation, the Court invalidated the prohibition
of paid circulators because it drastically reduced the number of petitioners
available, and made it less likely to acquire the number of signatures necessary
to place the issue on the ballot.54
B.

Procedural Posture of Buckley v. ACLF

The complaint in Buckley v. ACLF was originally filed in 1993, in
response to six state-imposed controls on the Colorado initiative-petition
process,55 passed by the Colorado State Legislature following Meyer.
American Constitutional Law Foundation56 and individual Colorado residents57
filed for declaratory and injunctive relief from restrictions on the circulation
and submission of petitions to propose state laws and constitutional
amendments. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
validated some restrictions of the Colorado statute and invalidated others as a
violation of political speech.58
52. Id. at 422.
53. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 788 (1974); See also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (upholding Minnesota’s electoral regulations which prohibit an
individual from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one political party).
54. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422-23.
55. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
56. The American Constitutional Law Foundation is a volunteer public interest, membership
organization with nearly 300,000 members, dedicated to the principles of constitutional selfgovernment, as incorporated in the First Amendment’s right of the people to peaceably petition
the government for redress of grievances. Its membership consisted primarily of individual
proponents, organizers, and circulators involved mostly in volunteer petitioning efforts. Mr. Bill
Orr is its unpaid Executive Director and Founder. See Respondent’s Brief, Buckley v. ACLF (No.
97-930), available in 1998 WL 328326.
57. Individual plaintiffs included: David Aitken, who, as chairman of the Colorado
Libertarian Party, had organized the circulation of several initiative petitions; Jon Baraga,
statewide petition coordinator for the Colorado Hemp Initiative; Craig Eley and Jack Hawkins,
circulators of petitions for the Safe Workplace Initiative and Worker’s Choice of Care Initiative;
Lonnie Haynes, an initiative-supporting member of ACLF; Alden Kautz, a circulator of numerous
initiative petitions; Bill Orr, executive director of ACLF and a qualified but unregistered voter,
who regularly participated in the petition process and wanted to circulate petitions; and William
David Orr, a minor who wanted to circulate petitions. See ACLF, Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092,
1096-1097 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Brief for Respondents David Aitken et al. at 2,3,5,6, Buckley
v. ACLF (No. 97-930).
58. ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. 995 (D.Colo. 1994). Among the restrictions the district
court found sufficient were the requirements that circulators be registered voters eligible to vote
on measures subject to petition, petitions be circulated within a six-month period, and the state
had a compelling need for names and addresses of circulators in affidavits attesting to validity of
signatures. Id. However, the district court found the provisions requiring circulators to wear
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The parties cross-appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part.59 The Tenth Circuit upheld some of the state’s regulations,60
but held that the Colorado statute requiring initiative and referendum petition
circulators to be registered electors, the provision requiring circulators for
initiative and referendum petitions to wear personal identification badges, and
certain provisions requiring disclosure of information regarding paid
circulators of initiative and referendum petitions violated free expression under
the First Amendment.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.62 Justice Ginsburg held that the
Tenth Circuit correctly separated necessary or proper ballot access controls
from the restrictions the Court believed unjustifiably inhibited the guarantee of
freedom of speech in the circulation of ballot-initiative petitions.63 The
Supreme Court reviewed the three controls invalidated by the Circuit Court.64
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, and filed an opinion. Justice
O’Connor concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, filing a
separate opinion joined by Justice Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented,
also filing a separate opinion.
C. Level of Scrutiny
In striking down the prohibition on paid circulators, the Court in Meyer v.
Grant65 held petition circulation was “core political speech” that involved
“interactive communication concerning political change,” protected by the
First Amendment.66 However, the state may provide a “substantial regulation”
to ensure the process is orderly, fair, and honest.67 The majority applies
“exacting scrutiny” when the restrictions in question significantly inhibit
communication with voters about proposed political change, and are not

identification badges, and the disclosure of monthly reports on paid circulators to be a burden on
political liberty, and an invalid restriction on core political speech. ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d
1092 (10th Cir. 1997).
59. ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at 1092.
60. Id. The restrictions upheld by the Circuit Court as reasonable regulations of the ballotinitiative process were: the requirement that petition circulators be at least 18 years old, COLO.
REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(1); the limitation of the petition circulation period to six months, § 1-40108; and the requirement that circulators attach to each petition section an affidavit containing,
inter alia, the circulator’s name and address, § 1-40-111(2). Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 637.
61. ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at 1092.
62. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 636.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 639.
65. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
66. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 639.
67. Id. at 640. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358; Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION

187

warranted by the state interests alleged to justify those restrictions.68 Petition
circulation has a political speech component,69 for which First Amendment
protection for such interaction is “at its zenith.”70 Regulations directly
burdening the one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition circulation are
subject to strict scrutiny.71 Restrictions on direct democracy can only be
upheld if the government can meet a two-prong test.72 A state must first
demonstrate it has a sufficiently important interest, and secondly, that the
means to protect that interest have been “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgement of associational freedoms.”73 The Court has stated that “no
litmus-paper test” will separate valid ballot-access provisions from invalid
interactive speech restrictions.74 However, the Court notes that restrictions in
the election process itself would require less exacting scrutiny.75 The majority,
in affirming the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Buckley v. ACLF, found all three
controls at issue to be excessively restrictive of political speech and therefore
invalid.76
Justice Thomas notes, however, that regulations of elections often will
directly restrict or otherwise burden core political speech and associational
rights.77 The framework for assessing the constitutionality, under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, of state election laws has been recently established.78
When a state’s rule imposes severe burdens on speech or association, it must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Lesser burdens imposed by
the state will trigger less exacting review, in which a state’s important
regulatory interests will typically justify reasonable restrictions.79 When core
68. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 642.
69. Id. at 653 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420).
72. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (“Even a ‘significant interference’ with protected rights
of political association may be sustained if the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”)
(quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431
(1968) (recognizing that “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved”); Shelton v. Thaker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1968).
73. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 653.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 646 (citing McIntyre v. Brown, 514 U.S. 334, 353 (1995) (recognizing a state’s
enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement) (holding that the
Ohio statute was not simply an election code provision subject to the lesser scrutiny balancing
test set forth in Burdick).
76. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
77. Id. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358-59; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992);
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788-90).
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political speech is at issue, the Court has ordinarily applied strict scrutiny
without first determining that the statute severely burdens speech.80 When a
state’s election law directly regulates core political speech, the Court has
always subjected the challenged restriction to strict scrutiny, and required that
the legislation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.81 However,
Justice Thomas also notes that when a state law indirectly regulates core
political speech, the Court has also applied strict scrutiny.82 In McIntyre, the
Court suggested that the sever/lesser burden framework is only resorted to if a
challenged election law regulates “the mechanics of the electoral process,” and
not speech.83 Cases that involve an election law that burdens voting and
associational interests are more difficult to predict.84
In contrast to Thomas’s view, Justice O’Connor finds a broader range of
restrictions to be subject to the lesser strict scrutiny standard. In order to allow
80. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 650 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. Id. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (Tennessee law prohibiting
solicitation of voters and distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of the entrance of a
polling place); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (Massachusetts
law prohibiting certain business entities from making expenditures for the purpose of affecting
referendum votes).
82. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 649-50. Justice Thomas notes that in Meyer, the Court
applied strict scrutiny because they determined that initiative petition circulation “of necessity
involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the
proposed change.” See also Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421.
83. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 650 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345).
84. Id. For example, the Court has subjected Connecticut’s requirement that voters in any
party primary be registered members of that party to strict scrutiny because it burdened the
“associational rights of the Party and its members.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 217 (1986). The Court similarly treated California’s laws limiting the term of office of
a party chair, and requiring that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern
California because they “burden[ed] the associational rights of political parties and their
members.” EU v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).
Although a state indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election
process, the Court invalidated the law under strict scrutiny. Id. The Court applied strict scrutiny
to California’s law denying a ballot position to independent candidates who had a registered
affiliation with a qualified political party within a year of the preceding primary election,
apparently because it “substantially” burdened the rights to vote and associate. Storer, 415 U.S.
at 729. In Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992), the Court determined that Illinois’ regulation of
the use of party names and its law establishing signature requirements for nominating petitions
severely burdened association by limiting new parties’ access to the ballot, and held both
challenged laws, as construed by the State Supreme Court, unconstitutional because they were not
narrowly tailored. Id. at 288-90, 294.
By contrast, the Court determined that Minnesota’s law preventing a candidate from
appearing on the ballot as the choice of more than one party burdened a party’s access to the
ballot and its associational rights, but not severely, and upheld the ban under lesser scrutiny.
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363. The Court likewise upheld Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting,
which imposed, at most, a “very limited” burden on voters’ freedom of choice and association.
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437.
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for regulations that ensure elections are fair and honest, the Court has
developed a flexible standard to review regulations of the electoral process.85
She states the proper inquiry is whether the state’s regulations directly and
substantially burden the one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition
circulation, or whether they primarily target the electoral process, imposing
only indirect and less substantial burdens on communication.86 The indirect
burdens should only be subject to a review for reasonableness.87 Each
opinion’s view on the correct level of scrutiny determines the validity of the
restriction in question.
D. Registered Voter Restriction88
The Colorado statute requiring initiative and referendum petition
circulators to be registered electors was found to unconstitutionally infringe on
free expression.89 By constitutional amendment,90 and corresponding statutory
change the next year,91 Colorado added to the requirement that petition
circulators not only be residents, but also registered voters.92 The State offered
as justification that registration demonstrates “commit[tment] to the Colorado
law making process” and facilitates verification of the circulator’s residence.93
The number of unregistered, but voter-eligible residents in Colorado at the
time of the trial was close to 620,000.94 The proportion of voter eligible, but
unregistered residents to registered residents, is not extraordinary in
comparison to other States. Because the registration requirement drastically

85. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding Hawaii’s
prohibition on write-in voting imposed only a limited burden upon the constitutional rights of
voters).
86. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
87. Id.
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(1) (1998) (“No section of a petition for any initiative or
referendum measure shall be circulated by any person who is not a registered elector and at least
eighteen years of age at the time the section is circulated.”).
89. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
90. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(6) (1980).
91. See 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws, Ch.56, § 4.
92. The Colorado law similarly provides that only registered voters may circulate petitions
to place candidates on the ballot, which was not challenged by the ACLF. Buckley v. ACLF, 119
S. Ct. 642 n.13. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-905(1) (1998) (“eligible elector” defined as
“registered elector”).
93. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 643 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, 10,14 (Attorney
General for Colorado)).
94. Id. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 289 tbl.403 (1997).
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reduces the number of persons available to circulate petitions, the majority
inquires whether the state’s concerns warrant the reduction.95
In examining the registered voter requirement, the majority opinion written
by Justice Ginsburg conducted a balancing test between the state interest, and
the reduction in the number of persons available to circulate petitions.96 The
Court noted the requirement that the circulators be voter-eligible, as well as
registered voters, decreases the pool of potential circulators similar to the ban
on paid circulators in Meyer.97 Justice Ginsburg notes the dicta in Meyer that
the challenged restriction reduces the chances that initiative proponents would
gather signatures sufficient in number to qualify for the ballot, thus limiting the
proposal’s “ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion.”98
This creates an undue imposition on political expression that the state failed to
justify.99 Ginsburg does not accept the state’s argument that registration to
vote is very easy because it does not lift the burden on speech at the time the
petition is circulated, 100 and some eligible voters choose not to register in order
to express their political opinion.101
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, agrees with the majority that the
restriction is properly invalidated under Meyer because initiative petition
circulation is core political speech, and thus subject to strict scrutiny.102 The
aim of a petition is to secure political change, and the First Amendment guards
against the state’s efforts to restrict free discussions about matters of public
concern.103 Assuming that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that
all circulators are residents, Justice Thomas notes that a large part of Colorado
residents are not registered voters, and the state could more precisely achieve
its interest of enforcing its election laws with a residency requirement.104

95. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 643 (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358).
96. Id. at 639-40.
97. Id. at 643 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422).
98. Id. (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423).
99. Id. at 644.
100. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id. A lead plaintiff and long-time active in ballot-initiative support testified that his
refusal to register is a “form of . . . private and public protest.” (testimony of William Orr,
Executive Director of the ACLF). Id. (citing 1 Tr. 223).
102. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. Id. In fact the briefs indicate that circulators do not discuss the merits of a proposed
change by initiate in any great depth. National Voter Outreach, Inc., an Amicus curiae in support
of respondents and the largest organizer of paid petition circulation drives in the United States,
describes most conversations between the circulator and the prospective petition signer as “brief.”
Brief for National Voter Outreach, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 21, Buckley v. ACLF (No. 97-930).
104. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 652 (Thomas, J., concurring). Colorado’s law requires
that petition circulators be registered electors, and while one must reside in Colorado in order to
be a registered voter. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-101(1)(b), Colorado does not have a separate
residency requirement. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 652 n.4.
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The dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, points out that Meyer did
not decide that a state is prohibited from imposing reasonable regulations on
circulation.105 Before this decision, a state could have imposed reasonable
regulations on the circulation of initiative petitions, so that some order could be
established over the inherently chaotic nature of democratic processes.106
Rehnquist notes that this decision calls into question the validity of any
regulation of petition circulation that would fall under the majority’s highly
abstract and mechanical test of invalidating a restriction that diminishes the
pool of petition circulators, or makes a proposal less likely to appear on the
ballot.107
Justice O’Connor also dissents from the majority because she believes the
registered voter requirement is a permissible regulation of the electoral
process.108 She notes that the Court has upheld analogous restrictions on
qualifications to vote in a primary election, and on candidate eligibility as
reasonable regulations of the electoral process.109 Because the requirement is
neutral qualification for participation in the petition process, it only indirectly
and incidentally burdens the communicative aspects of petition circulation thus
subjecting it to a reasonable test.110 Agreeing with the Chief Justice that this
requirement can easily be satisfied, and that it differs from the prohibition on
paid circulators invalidated in Meyer, she notes the registration requirement
does not ban an existing class of circulators, or silence those who are “able and
willing” to circulate ballot initiative petitions.111 Additionally, the existence
and severity of the burden on one-on-one communication is not as clearly
established in the record as the majority suggests.112 O’Connor applies her
lesser strict scrutiny to require the state to advance a legitimate interest to be a
reasonable regulation of the electoral process, as applied in Burdick.113 She

105. Id. at 659.
106. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358.
107. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 660.
108. Id. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 655. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756-62 (1973) (upholding
qualifications to vote in primary); Storer, 415 U.S. at 728-37 (upholding candidate eligibility
requirement).
110. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 655.
111. Id.
112. Id. Witness Jon Baraga testified that some potential circulators are not registered to vote
because they feel the political process is not responsive to their needs, but went on to testify that
many of the same people would register to vote if an initiative they supported were placed on the
ballot. ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1001.
113. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428. In upholding Hawaii’s prohibition of write-in voting, the
Court noted that although the voter’s rights are fundamentally significant under the constitutional
structure, it did not follow that “the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for
political purposes through the ballot are absolute.” Id. at 433 (citing Illinois Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
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accepts Colorado’s arguments that it is necessary to enforce its laws
prohibiting circulation fraud and to guarantee the states ability to exercise its
subpoena power over those who violate these laws, as two patently legitimate
interests.114 O’Connor would uphold the requirement as a reasonable
regulation of Colorado’s electoral process.
E.

Identification Badge Restriction115

The Colorado statute requiring circulators for initiative and referendum
petitions to wear personal identification badges was found to have
unconstitutionally infringed on the circulators’ First Amendment rights.116 The
state interest in requiring name badges enables the public to identify, as well as
the state to be able to apprehend petition circulators who engage in
misconduct.117
The majority found that the badge requirement is invalid as it requires
circulators to display their names.118 Justice Ginsburg states that the notarized
submission available to law enforcement renders the Colorado’s provision for
personal names in identification badges less necessary.119 The badges reveal
personal information about the circulators when “reaction to the circulator’s
message is immediate, and may be the most intense, emotional, and
unreasoned,” whereas the affidavit does not expose the circulator to the risk of

114. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 656. See also, Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366-67.
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(2)(1998). The statute provides:
(a) “All circulators who are not to be paid for circulating petitions
concerning ballot issues shall display an identification badge that
includes the words “VOLUNTEER CIRCULATOR” in bold-faced type
which is clearly legible and the circulator’s name.”
(b) “All circulators who are to be paid for circulating petitions concerning
ballot issues shall display an identification badge that includes the words
“PAID CIRCULATOR” in bold-faced type which is clearly legible, the
circulator’s name, and the name and telephone number of the individual
employing the circulator.”
Id. Colorado enacted the provision five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Meyer.
Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645. A similar requirement that badges disclose whether the
circulator is paid or a volunteer, and if paid by whom, was not challenged by the ACLF. Id.
Colorado does not require identification badges for persons who gather signatures to place
candidates on the ballot. Id. n.18. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-905 (1998) (regulations
governing candidate-petition circulators). An unchallenged provision provides that each petition
must contain along with the collected signatures of voters, the circulator’s name, address, and
signature. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645.
116. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645.
117. Brief for Petitioner at 36-37; see also, Reply Brief at 17.
118. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646.
119. Id. at 645.
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the “heat of the moment” harassment.120 The name identification inhibits
participation in the petitioning process.121 The two individuals who testified
believed that it discourages participation because of the controversial views
that such initiatives may include such as legalizing marijuana.122 Petition
circulators must endeavor to persuade electors to sign the petition. The
necessity for the freedom to anonymously speak one’s views is heightened for
the petition circulator because the badge requirement compels personal name
identification at the precise moment when the circulator’s anonymity is
greatest.123
The Court applied the decision of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n.124
McIntyre applied “exacting scrutiny” to Ohio’s fraud prevention justifications
in holding that the ban on anonymous speech violated the First Amendment.125
The complaint in McIntyre challenged an Ohio law that prohibited the
distribution of anonymous campaigning literature.126 Because “circulating a
petition is akin to distributing a handbill in invoking one-on-one
communication, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s invalidation under the
First Amendment.127 The name badge requirement does not qualify under the
“more limited [election process] identification requirement alluded to in
McIntyre.128 The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals invalidation of the
badge requirement because it discourages participation in the petition
circulation process by forcing name identification without sufficient cause.129
The other justices unanimously agree that the identification badge
requirement is invalid because it directly regulates the content of speech.
Justice Thomas would apply a stricter standard than the majority applied.130
The requirement is not narrowly tailored, and the state failed to satisfy its

120. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645 (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1004
(observing that affidavits are not instantly accessible, and are therefore less likely to be used “for
such purposes as retaliation or harassment”). See also, Brief for Respondent, at 47.
121. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645.
122. Id. A witness told of the harassment that he personally experienced as a circulator of a
hemp initiative petition. See ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1001. He also testified to the
reluctance of potential circulators to face the recrimination and retaliation that bearers of petitions
on “volatile” issues sometimes encounter (stating that “with their name on a badge, it makes them
afraid” (testimony of Jon Baraga)). Id. at 1001-1002.
123. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646.
124. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
125. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645-46.
126. Id. at 645.
127. Id. at 646.
128. Id. (citing to McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353) (“We recognize that a State’s enforcement
interest might justify a more limited identification requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause
for inhibiting the leafleting at issue here.”); see also id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
129. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646.
130. Id. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
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burden of demonstrating that fraud is a real problem.131 Justice O’Connor,
along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, agrees with the majority that the First
Amendment renders the identification badge requirement unconstitutional.132
O’Connor notes that the badge imports into the one-on-one dialogue of petition
circulation, a message the circulator might otherwise refrain from delivering,
and that it deters some initiative petition circulators from disseminating their
ideas.133
F.

Financial Disclosure Provision134

Colorado’s disclosure provisions were enacted in response to the Court’s
invalidation of the prohibition of paid circulators in Meyer.135 The statute
requires proponents of petitions, who pay circulators, to file both monthly
reports during the circulation period in addition to a final report when the
initiative petition is submitted to the Secretary of the State.136 Colorado’s
reasons to enact such restrictions were that public disclosure of the political
contributions and expenditures inform voters in making intelligent choices in
the election process, and help to combat fraud.137 The disclosure deters
circulation fraud and abuse by encouraging petition circulators to be truthful

131. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 651. See also Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm’n v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 647 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
132. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 654, 662 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 654.
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-121(1998). The statute provides in relevant part:
(1) “The proponents of the petition shall file . . . the name, address, and county of
voter registration of all circulators who were paid to circulate any section of the
petition, the amount paid per signature, and the total amount to each circulator.
The filing shall be made at the same time the petition is filed with the secretary of
state . . .”
(2) “The proponents of the petition shall sign and file monthly reports with the
secretary of state, due ten days after the last day of each month in which petitions
are circulators. Monthly reports shall set forth the following:
(a) The names of the proponents;
(b) The name and the residential and business addresses of each of the paid
circulators;
(c) The name of the proposed ballot measure for which petitions are being
circulated by paid circulators; and
(d) The amount of money paid and owed to each paid circulator for petition
circulation during the month in question.”
135. See 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws, Ch.183, § 1.
136. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-121 (1998). Colorado does not require similar disclosure
provisions for persons who gather signatures to place candidates on the ballot. See generally
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-905 (1998) (regulations governing candidate-petition circulators).
137. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 61-7.
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and self-disciplined.138 These are among the interests the Court found to be
substantial in Buckley v. Valeo.139 Colorado has a legitimate interest in law
enforcement to detect and identify in a timely basis, abusive or fraudulent
circulators. 140 Moreover it provides facts useful to voters who are weighing
their options by evaluating the sincerity, or the potential bias of any circulator
that approaches them.141
The majority opinion looks to Buckley v. Valeo142 for the standard of
review to apply to the restriction of disclosing paid circulation.143 Justice
Ginsburg applies “exacting scrutiny” when compelled disclosure of campaignrelated payments is at issue.144 The Tenth Circuit did not invalidate the
Colorado statute “as a whole.”145 There is a substantial state interest in
disclosing names of initiative sponsors, and of the amounts they have spent
gathering support for their initiatives.146 The Tenth Circuit invalidated the
provision demanding “detailed monthly disclosures.147 The Court rejected
compelled disclosure of the name and address of each paid circulator, and the
amount of money paid and owed to each circulator during the month.148 As the
Court of Appeals did not identify any infirmities in the required reporting, the
majority expressed no opinion whether those monthly report prescriptions
would survive review standing alone.149 Nevertheless, monthly disclosures are
no longer required. As for the final report provision, the Tenth Circuit
invalidated only the portion that compels disclosure of information specific to
each paid circulator.150 As modified the final report will reveal the amount
paid per petition signature, and thus the total amount paid to the circulators.151

138. Id. at 67
139. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 656 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67, 68 (per curium) (holding that the
Government has a substantial interest in requiring candidates to disclose the sources of campaign
contributions to provide the electorate with information about “the interests to which a candidate
is most likely to be responsive” to “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption,” and “to detect violations of the contribution limitations”).
140. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647.
141. Id.
142. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
143. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647.
144. Id. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64-65.
145. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646.
146. Id. at 647.
147. Id. (citing Meyer v. ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1105).
148. Id. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-120(2)(b),(d) (1998).
149. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647.
150. Id. at 646-47. In particular, the Court invalidated the disclosure of the circulator’s names
and addresses and the total amount paid to each circulator. See ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at
1104-05.
151. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647.
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The Court notes that disclosure of the names of initiative sponsors, and the
amounts spent gathering support for their initiative responds to the substantial
state interests.152 However, Justice Ginsburg notes that ballot initiatives differ
from the disclosure provisions of the money paid to or for the candidates in
Buckley v. Valeo because the former does not involve the risk of “quid pro
quo” corruption.153 As stated in Meyer, “the risk of fraud or corruption, or the
appearance thereof, is more remote at the petition stage of an initiative than at
the time of balloting.”154 Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court is not
prepared to assume that a professional circulator is more likely to accept false
signatures than a volunteer.155 The Court believes that Colorado can meet their
substantial interests in regulating the ballot-initiative process with the less
restrictive measures validated by the Court of Appeals.156 The statute as it
stands leaves in tact the proper ballot access controls that do not unjustifiably
inhibit the circulation of ballot initiative petitions.157
Justice Thomas views the burdens that the reporting requirements impose
do not constitute a “severe burden” on core political speech.158 However, any
type of disclosure can seriously infringe on the privacy of association and
belief granted by the First Amendment and must pass a “strict test.”159
Recognizing that the state requires the identification of only paid circulators,
and the risk of improper conduct is more remote at the petition stage of an
initiative, the law does not serve the state interest of providing a complete
picture of how money is being spent to get a measure on the ballot.160The
provision as rewritten by the lower courts would pass the rigors of strict
scrutiny.161 Assuming the state’s interests in having the information available
to the press and voters before the initiative is voted is compelling, Justice
Thomas finds that the reporting provision as modified by the lower courts

152. Id. (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1003).
153. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 427-28 (1998) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 (“The
risk of corruption perceived in cases involving risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.”)); McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 352 n.15.
154. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 648 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 427).
155. Justice Ginsburg’s assumption is based on professional circulators may depend on a
reputation for competence and integrity for future assignments, whereas a volunteer is motivated
entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the ballot. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426.
156. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 648.
157. Id. at 649.
158. Id. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64, 66).
160. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 652.
161. The statute as it stands after this decision provides proponents must disclose the amount
paid per petition signature and the total amount paid to each circulator, without identifying each
circulator at the time the petition is filed. Id. at 653.
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ensures the public will receive information regarding the financial support
behind the initiative proposal before they can vote.162
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagrees that the First Amendment renders the
disclosure requirements unconstitutional.163 Rehnquist believes the majority’s
reasoning is illogical because in the portion that the Court left untouched, all
circulators, whether paid or volunteer, must surrender their anonymity in the
affidavit that was upheld by the Tenth Circuit as not significantly burdening
political expression.164 This is in contrast to the majority’s reliance that there
is no risk of “quid pro quo” corruption when money is paid to ballot initiatives
circulators, and that paid circulators should not have to surrender their
anonymity enjoyed by their volunteer counterparts.165 The only additional
piece of information that the disclosure requirement asks is the amount paid to
each circulator.166 Through the affidavit, the identity of the circulators as well
as the total amount of money paid will be a matter of public record.167 This
additional requirement is not sufficient to invalidate the disclosure
requirements that serve substantial interests and are narrowly tailored to satisfy
the First Amendment.168
Justice O’Connor finds the majority’s holding that the disclosure
provisions are partially unconstitutional to be most disturbing.169 She agrees
with Rehnquist that the disclosure reports are virtually indistinguishable from
the affidavit, which the Court suggests is a permissible regulation of the
electoral process.170 Furthermore, the disclosure reports are a lesser burden
than the affidavits because the latter are completed by the petition circulator,
while the former are completed by the initiative proponent and are thus a step
removed from petition circulation.171 Additionally, the affidavit is not an
effective substitute because the affidavits are not completed until after all
signatures have been collected, and thus after the time that the information is

162. Id.
163. Id. at 662.
164. Id. (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at 1099). Colorado law requires that each circulator
must submit as affidavit that must include the circulator’s name, the address at which he or she
resides, including the street name and number, the city or town, and the country. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 1-40-111(2) (1998). The majority relies on the constitutionality of the affidavit in
invalidating the registered voter requirement. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 644.
165. Id. at 662.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 656 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgement in part
and dissenting in part).
170. Id. See also id. at 645-46.
171. Id. at 657.
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needed.172 The public would have more access to the monthly disclosure
reports, and as the District Court found, the public will have “greater difficulty
in finding [the] names and addresses [of petition circulators] in the masses of
papers filed with the petitions as compared with the monthly reports.”173
Under the flexible strict scrutiny, a regulation of the electoral process with an
indirect and insignificant effect on speech such as the disclosure provision
should be upheld so long as it advances a legitimate government interest.174
However, Justice O’Connor would still uphold the disclosure provision even
under the more exacting scrutiny applied by the majority and Justice
Thomas.175
IV. ANALYSIS
The restrictions imposed by Colorado were found to significantly inhibit
communication with voters about proposed political change, and were not
justified by Colorado’s interest in administrative efficiency, fraud detection, or
voter education.176 Although the exact level of scrutiny applied by the Court is
debatable, it can be determined that some type of flexible standard will be
applied to election regulations as applied by all of the Justices in Burdick. The
First Amendment hurdle for the state is a difficult one to jump over, but it is
clearable. Although the Court has on occasion invalidated state laws that
severely burden political speech,177 it has repeatedly upheld reasonable state
regulation of the electoral process.178 In examining how the Court balanced
the state’s interest to enact the voter registration requirement, the identification
badge requirement, and the financial disclosure provisions, states may look to
Buckley v. ACLF to develop an efficient and reasonable direct democracy
system, to create a regulatory system that will not overburden the petitioners’
First Amendment rights while achieving the desired protections.

172. Id. at 658. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-111(2) (1998) (“Any signature added to a
section of a petition after the affidavit has been executed shall be invalid.”).
173. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 658 (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1004).
174. Id. at 656.
175. Id. at 658.
176. See id. at 638.
177. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334 (invalidating Ohio’s statutory prohibition against
distribution of any anonymous campaign literature as violative of the First Amendment);
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 780 (invalidating Ohio’s statute requiring early filing deadline for
independent candidates as placing an unconstitutional burden on voting and associational rights
of supporters of independent candidates); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 414 (invalidating Colorado’s
prohibition against paying circulators as violative of the First Amendment).
178. See, e.g., Timmons, 520 U.S. at 351 (upholding Minnesota’s antifusion laws prohibiting
candidates from appearing on the ballot as candidate of more than one political party); Burdick,
504 U.S. at 428 (upholding Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting).
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What is the Proper Level of Scrutiny?

Although the Court applied strict scrutiny, it should have given more
credence to the state to provide “a substantial regulation of elections if they are
to be fair and honest, and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic processes.”179 The majority opinion was silent as
to the exact level of scrutiny, departing from past decisions such as Meyer,
McIntyre, and Burdick. Ginsburg’s majority opinion reasoning however more
closely follows the opinion by Justice O’Connor, as opposed to Justice
Thomas. Although Justice O’Connor is more willing to find regulations to
indirectly impact political speech than the Court, the majority examines each
restriction to determine if it has a direct or indirect impact. This reasoning is in
stark contrast to that of Justice Thomas, who would find almost any restriction
on the election process to have an impact on political speech and to render it
unconstitutional. No other Justice in this case shares his view that restrictions
that indirectly impact the election process are invalid. It is safe to say that the
Court will apply a flexible standard, but whether the restriction will fall under
the lesser or the stricter standard is still uncertain.
The Court, in justifying the invalidation of the regulations in question,
emphasized other restrictions in place that adequately achieve Colorado’s
purpose. The Court did not provide its reasons as to why those restrictions not
reviewed were any less burdensome than those that were. In fact, as pointed
out by Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, the affidavit that was
assumed to be a legitimate restriction in order to justify invalidating the voterregistration requirement, demands almost the same information to be disclosed
as required by the financial disclosure statute that was struck down. The logic
Justice Ginsburg used to invalidate certain restrictions, noting other restrictions
already exist, gives little guidance to a state legislature desiring to meet the
need to regulate the direct democracy system.180 Determining the exact level

179. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 636 (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 730; Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
at 788; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358).
180. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 648. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426-27; Meyer v. ACLF,
120 F.3d, at 1103, 1105; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-130(1)(b) (1998) (making it criminal
to forge initiative-petition signatures); § 1-40-132(1) (initiative-petition section deemed void if
circulator has violated any provision of the laws governing circulation).
To ensure grass roots support, Colorado conditions placement of an initiative proposal
on the ballot on the proponent’s submission of valid signatures representing five percent of the
total votes cast for all candidates for Secretary of State at the previous general election. COLO.
CONST. art. V, §1(2); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-109(1) (1998); see also Meyer, 486 U.S. at 42526; Meyer v. ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1105.
Furthermore, in aid of efficiency, veracity, or clarity, Colorado has provided for an array
of process measures not contested here by ACLF. These measures prescribe, inter alia, a single
subject per initiative limitation, COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106.5(1)(a) (1998); a signature
verification method, § 1-40-116; a large plain-English notice alerting potential signers of petitions
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of scrutiny applied by the Court can be difficult because of the departure from
its earlier decisions of explicitly stating what the proper scrutiny is to apply.
The Court will apply strict scrutiny to any regulation that directly impacts core
political speech, but any lesser regulation will be closely scrutinized to
determine it’s impact on the initiative process.
B.

Registration Requirements

Colorado attempted to follow the Court’s direction in Meyer, in drafting
legislation that allowed registered voters to circulate initiative-petitions while
upholding the goal of protecting the decency of the process. Colorado
experienced a surge in the use of paid petition circulators and in the number of
abuses reported.181 The Court, by noting the substantial need for regulation,
should have given more credit to Colorado’s compelling interests and the
minimal burden it places on circulators. The Colorado statute does not place
any restrictions on the ability to register to vote, nor does it prohibit any person
from registering who wants to circulate petitions. In fact, the state has made
the process of registering readily available to anyone who qualifies.182
Colorado law establishes their requirements for voter registration, that a person
be 18 years of age, a U.S. citizen, and a resident of the state for at least 30
days.183 Registering to vote in Colorado is an exceedingly easy procedure that
can be done at the county clerk’s office, by postcard, or at a driver’s license
examination facility.184
For those who feel the democratic system is not responsive to their
political needs, they have the opportunity to have a direct impact by using the
initiative process. Those who choose not to vote for political reasons can still
express their political views, and register to become circulators. There is no
requirement to vote once a citizen has registered. It is those that refuse to
register whom prevent themselves from being able to decide the issue they
want (or for which they are paid) to promote. There is evidence that a few
people specifically do not register out of protest for their political beliefs.
These people have the right under the First Amendment to not be forced into
participating in the system they differ from ideologically. However, there is no
prohibition on unregistered citizens from organizing the initiative, and having
volunteers or paid circulators gather signatures. Without the restriction,
special interest groups are left to overtake the initiative process from the
citizen. While it might make it more burdensome for a few individuals, the

to the law’s requirements, § 1-40-110(1); and the text of the affidavit to which all circulators must
subscribe, § 1-40-111(2).
181. Amicus Brief at 12, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 212593.
182. See id. at 22.
183. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-101.
184. See id. §§ 1-2-202, 208, and 213.
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preservation of the system to ensure access to the grass roots proponents as
well as the heavily financed special interest groups should give substantial
weight to allow certain restrictions. The same forces that caused the need for
direct democracy are quickly eradicating its objectives, the ability of the
citizen to directly initiate law that the legislature has failed to provide because
of the influence of special interest groups. Ironically, those groups are finding
it just as easy to influence ballot propositions with large money expenditures as
it is to use money to influence the legislatures. As the price tag for putting an
initiative on the ballot is driven up through the large pocketbooks of the special
interest groups, grassroots efforts with little financial backing effectively
become shut out of the system that was originally designed to support those
efforts. Granted, protections exist that the courts have not invalidated,
however the fact remains that the average citizen who does not have the
$900,000 to combat the spending power of any opposing special interest
groups will not have a chance to be heard.
C. Disclosure Provisions
As explained in Buckley v. Valeo, disclosure provides the electorate with
information “as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is
spent to aid electors in evaluating those who seek their vote.”185 Additional
disclosure deters actual corruption and avoids the appearance of corruption in
exposing large contributions and expenditures.186 The Court has not provided
any justification for the invalidation other than the purpose is served by already
served by the affidavit that was presumed valid. As the affidavit and
disclosure provisions are similar, it is uncertain how the Court would analyze
the affidavit on its own validity. Keeping in line with Buckley v. Valeo, the
Court should support the state in its effort to shed light into an area typically
abused by the big budgeted special interest groups. By providing the voters
with accurate information, they will be better equipped to make informed
decisions. The Tenth Circuit did keep some disclosure provisions in tact that
allow Colorado to achieve part of its goal. The holding however, provides
more confusion as to the proper level of disclosure required.
D. Implications on the State and the Citizen
As noted by both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor,
Colorado’s registration requirement parallels the requirements in place in at
least nineteen other states and the District of Colombia that explicitly require
185. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 66 (internal
quotations marks omitted)).
186. Id. at 647 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67); see also Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (observing that an “informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints in misgovernment).
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candidate petition circulators be electors,187 and at least one other state requires
that its petition circulators be state residents.188 These now are questionable in
light of the Court’s decision in Buckley v. ACLF.
According to the majority, a restriction that significantly inhibits
communication with voters about proposed political change will be found
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. A state should be confident in
passing a regulation on the electoral process itself, and not one that inhibits
either voters, or the circulators of petitions. However, as each Justice noted, a
residency requirement for circulators would be considered a reasonable
regulation in light of the state’s compelling interest maintaining jurisdiction
over the circulators, and preventing fraud.189 Six months after Buckley v.
ACLF, the Southern District Court of Mississippi decided the case Kean v.
Clark,190 which challenged the validity of an amendment to the Mississippi
Constitution.191 The state imposed restrictions on the circulators of petitions
for ballot initiatives.192 The court held that the residency requirement for
circulators of petitions for ballot initiatives did not violate their First
Amendment rights.193 This regulation differs from the Colorado regulation
invalidated in Buckley v. ACLF, because it only requires the circulators to be
residents, not registered voters. This is the type of regulation the state should
187. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 661 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The states that
require candidate petition circulators to be electors are: ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 16-315 (1996)
(Arizona); CAL.ELEC.CODE ANN. § 8106(b)(4) (West 1996) (California); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-905 (1998) (Colorado); CONN. GEN.STAT. § 9-410 (Supp.1998) (Connecticut); D.C.CODE ANN.
§ 1-1312(b)(2) (1992) (Washington D.C.); IDAHO CODE § § 34-626, 34-1807 (Supp.1998)
(Idaho); ILL.COMP.STAT., ch. 10, § § 5/7-10, 5/8-8, 5/10-4 (Supp.1998) (Illinois);
KAN.STAT.ANN. § 25-205(d) (1993) (Kansas); MICH.COMP.LAWS § 168.544c(3) (Supp.1998)
(Michigan); MO.REV.STAT. § 115.325(2) (1997) (Missouri); NEB.REV.STAT. § 32-630
(Supp.1997) (Nebraska); N.Y.ELEC.LAW § § 6-132, 6-140, 6-204, 6-206 (McKinney 1998) (New
York); OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 3503.06 (1996) (Ohio); 25 PA.CONS.STAT. § 2869 (1994)
(Pennsylvania); R.I.GEN.LAWS § 17-23-12 (1996) (Rhode Island); S.D.COMP.LAWS § 12-1-3
(1995) (South Dakota); VA.CODE ANN. § 24.2-521 (Supp.1998) (Virginia); W.VA.CODE § 3-5-23
(1994) (West Virginia); WIS.STAT. § 8.40 (1996) (Wisconsin); Wyo.Stat. § 22-5-304 (1992)
(Wyoming).
188. Id. n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See GA.CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-132(g)(3)(A), 212170(d)(1) (1993 and Supp. 1997) (Georgia).
189. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 644, 651-652. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor found the voter registration requirement in which voters must be residents, to be a
reasonable regulation. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgement in part and dissenting in part).
190. 56 F.Supp.2d 719 (S.D. Miss. 1999). The same court has previously invalidated
Mississippi’s registered-voter requirement as unconstitutional. See Term Limits Leadership
Council, Inc. v. Clark, 984 F.Supp. 470 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
191. Mississippi adopted the indirect initiative for Constitutional Amendments in 1992.
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 28 tbl.1.
192. Keen, 56 F.Supp.2d at 721; see MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273 (12) (1998).
193. Id. at 732.
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implement in order to achieve the goals of administrative efficiency, fraud
detection and prevention, and voter education while imposing the least possible
burden on the petition circulators. If this case would reach the Supreme Court,
they will most likely uphold the residency requirement following the
suggestions made by the Court in Buckley v. ACLF.
An overwhelming 84 per cent of California citizens polled agreed that “an
average voter cannot make an intelligent choice” with so many initiatives on
the ballot posing complex questions.194 Because the initiative process bypasses
the legislative process, safeguards are necessary to provide for an informed
electorate. The Court has prevented the state from this objective. The
Supreme Court in this decision has made it more difficult for a state to control
its own direct democracy process, while providing special interest groups with
more leeway for potential abuse. While the restrictions placed minor obstacles
to the petition process, it did not initiate any burden that would deny any new
group the ability to register. Colorado’s intention was to safeguard the process
to ensure the voters knew why the issue is being proposed to make an
informative decision. Although the Court has struck down a variety of
restrictions imposed by Colorado to regulate its initiative process, states can
now develop a statute that will achieve the objectives of creating a fair and
ordered system for its direct democracy process.
A good example for the state to follow would be the Mississippi statute.195
The Court has moved towards accepting restrictions placed by states on their
own direct democracy process. Moving from a unanimous decision in Meyer,
the decision in Buckley v. ACLF suggests the Court is willing to give the States
more power to control their own affairs. By using a more flexible level of
scrutiny, regulations that indirectly impose a burden on the electoral process
will be upheld. Through the 1999-2000 term, there are signs of Rehnquist
gaining additional support for furthering state rights.196 A third time may
prove to be the charm for the state desiring to protect the direct democracy
system for their citizens, and restrict special interest groups from tarnishing an
otherwise legitimate attempt to give control to the people of the state.
V. CONCLUSION
The objective of direct democracy was to grant power to the citizen at a
time when the legislature was unresponsive to the public’s needs. At a time
when corruption and influence from special interest groups hampered the
ability of the elected representatives to promote legislation beneficial to the

194. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 4 (citing “Voters Say Initiative Process is Too
Complicated, Out of Control,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at A1, A38, A43).
195. See supra text accompanying note 192.
196. See David G. Savage, Chief Justice Rehnquist Seems Determined to Limit Federal
Authority, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1999, at A8.
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common citizen populist movements looked to direct democracy as a tool to
combat such abuses. Direct democracy possesses many benefits, but there are
also many risks if the system goes unregulated. While some restrictions do
place burdens on the political speech of a few citizens desiring to cause change
in their society at the same time as protesting that society, restrictions are a
necessary evil to ensure the process is fair, efficient, and free from corruption.
Colorado’s most recent attempt to provide such restrictions was invalidated by
the Supreme Court in Buckley v. ACLF. However, the decision did leave some
restrictions in tact to meet some of the state’s objectives. Furthermore, this
case can serve as a guide to states that find it necessary to protect their direct
democracy system for their citizens, without placing any undue burdens on the
fundamental right to political speech.
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